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It is now universally acknowledged that pollution knows no national geographical
boundaries and excessive pollution generated in a country is likely to have serious
adverse implications for the rest of the international community. The acceptance of
the above reality has led to several international conferences aimed at multilateral
agreements to combat environmental degradation.
Along side the above developments in the international policy making arena, a
small theoretical literature has developed to analyse the implications of cross-border
pollution and/or to examine the welfare implications of environmental policy reform
(see, for example, Merriﬁeld (1988), Copeland and Taylor (1995), Copeland (1994,
1996), Ludema and Wooton (1994, 1997), Beghin et al (1997), Turunen-Red and
Woodland (1998, 2000), and Hatzipanayotou et al (2000)).
With the exception of Hatzipanayotou et al (2000), the rest of the emerging
literature does not allow for the co-existence of abatements by both private and pub-
lic sectors.1 In reality, however, one observes the co-existence of private and public
abatement activities. The share of public abatement expenditure in total abatement
expenditure varies quite a lot from country to country and from one type of pollution
to another. According to the OECD,2 as far as abatement of water pollution in the
early 1990s is concerned, the share of public expenditure in the total expenditure are
66% in the USA and the Netherlands and only 12% in the UK. As for abatement
of air pollution, whereas the share of public abatement in the Netherlands and the
UK are 55% and 30% respectively, it is only 6% in the case of the USA. Given these
ﬁgures, it is important that both types of abatements are taken into consideration
in analysing environmental policies. Hatzipanayotou et al (2000) allow for the co-
existence of abatements by both private and public sectors in a North-South model in
1There is a separate literature on public abatement of pollution in a somewhat diﬀerent context
(see, Khan (1995) and Chao and Yu (1999)).
2See OECD (1996).
1which pollution is only generated in the South and the North suﬀers from it because
of cross-border pollution. They analyse the situation in which the North can inﬂuence
pollution emission policies in the South by the strategic use of international trans-
fers. The present paper extends that framework to a North-North (or, South-South)
situation in which both countries are symmetric in the sense that they both create
pollution, suﬀer from domestically and overseas generated pollution, and use the same
set of instruments (non-cooperatively) to control pollution emission. The only com-
mon feature between the model in Hatzipanayotou et al (2000) and the present one is
the co-existence of private and public abatement of pollution.
The existence of public abatement brings in an additional instrument at the
disposal of the policy maker for combating pollution emission on top of the normal
instruments such as an emission tax, viz. funds made available for public abate-
ment activities. The existence of multiple instruments, viz. emission tax and funds
made available for public abatement of pollution, in turn introduces two interesting
issues. First, it raises the question as to how exactly the aforesaid funds are raised by
the policy maker. Since there is considerable evidence that emission taxes are often
earmarked for pollution activities by governments,3 we assume that the government
allocates a fraction of emission tax revenue for public sector abatement activities, and
this fraction is a policy instrument available to the government.4
The second implication of the existence of multiple environmental policy in-
struments is that it widens the scope of multilateral reforms of environmental policies.
One of the objectives of the present paper is to consider a number of alternative multi-
lateral environmental policy reform exercises depending on the scope of these reforms,
i.e. we allow for the reform of emission taxes while the individual countries are free
to adjust the other policy instrument.
3For example, Brett and Keen (2000) note that, in the US, it is quite customary for environment
taxes to be earmarked for speciﬁc environment related public expenditure. In particular, such tax
proceeds are commonly paid into trust funds that ﬁnance various clean-up activities, or are spend on
road and public transport networks.
4All our qualitative results except one will go through even if we assume that public abatement
is funded from lump-sum taxation of the consumers. The exception will be noted in footnote 13.
2Two points are to be noted. First, it is known in the literature that even in
the absence of cross-border pollution, uncoordinated policy-making may lead to sub-
optimality.5 Second, it is acknowledged that multilateral agreements often contain
loopholes which can be exploited by opportunistic governments. In the context of
multilateral agreements on trade policy reforms, Copeland (1990) showed that multi-
lateral agreement with respect to a trade policy instrument may entice a government
to move to a more costly trade policy instrument, though the latter will not completely
oﬀset the welfare improving eﬀect of the former. Walz and Wellisch (1997) and Tsai
(1999) carried out a similar analysis in the context of strategic environmental policies.
More recently, Sturm (2001) has shown, in the context of strategic environmental pol-
icy literature, that the nature of imperfect competition and preferences, inter alia, are
crucial for determining the eﬀects of restricting the use of trade policy instruments. In
this context, our paper is more in line with Copeland (1990) in that all the markets are
perfectly competitive and the two instruments are aimed at the same distortion, viz.
pollution distortion in our case and trade distortion in the case of Copeland (1990).
However, in contrast to Copeland (1990) where the two trade instruments are chosen
in two stages of a game, the two environmental instruments in this paper are not
hierarchical and are chosen by the government simultaneously.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 spells out the model. The
non-cooperative optimal values of the policy instruments are characterised in section
3 which also carries out a simple comparative static exercise. In section 4, we con-
sider the eﬀects on individual country welfare and pollution levels of a number of
multilateral policy reforms, where the initial levels of the instruments are at their
Nash optimum levels. In this section we consider comprehensive as well as partial
reforms of policy instruments. We also examine the eﬀects of multilateral agreements
on target reductions of pollution emission. In section 5, we analyse the case where the
initial levels of the policy instruments are at arbitrary levels and examine the eﬀects
5See Ulph (1997) for a survey of the literature.
3of multilateral reforms that take the policy instruments towards their non-cooperative
second-best levels. Finally, some concluding remarks are made in section 6.
2 The model
We consider a general equilibrium model with two countries –home and foreign– where
pollution is generated as a byproduct of production in both countries. It is assumed
that residents of both countries suﬀer disutility from pollution generated by local
producers and from pollution generated in the other country and transmitted across-
borders.
Both countries produce, under perfectly competitive conditions, a number of
goods which are freely traded in world markets. We assume that the two countries are
small open economies in the goods markets so that they face exogenous commodity
prices. Factors of production are internationally immobile and inelastically supplied.
Factor markets are also perfectly competitive. In both countries, abatement of pollu-
tion is undertaken by both private producers and the public sector sequentially. First,
private producers in the two countries carry out some abatement of pollution that
they generate in response to emission taxes in the two countries at the rates t and t¤
respectively.6 The public sector of each country then abates some of the remaining
pollution. The levels of public sector abatement in the two countries are denoted re-
spectively by g and g¤. We discuss the determination of g and g¤ later on. In both
countries private producers and the public sector compete in equal terms in factor
markets.
We proceed to develop the model for the home country; the model for the
foreign country follows analogously. Let v(= vp +vg) denote the vector of total factor
endowments, where vp and vg are respectively the vectors of factors used in the
production of the private goods and in the public abatement activities. The country’s
6Henceforth, asterisks denote the variables and functions in the foreign country.
4maximum value of production of private goods is denoted by a restricted gross domestic
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where p is the vector of world commodity prices (exogenously given), T(vp) is the
country’s aggregate technology set, x is the vector of net outputs, and z is the amount
of pollution emission by the private sector (net of the amount abated by the private
sector).7;8 For a given level of abatement carried out by the public sector, as will be
show later on, the vector of factors uses in the public sector, vg, is uniquely determined.
Therefore, since the total endowments of all the factors of production, v, is exogenously
given, vp is also uniquely determined for a given value of g. Moreover, since p does
not vary in our analysis, for notational simplicity the revenue function can therefore
be written as R(t;g).
It is well known (e.g. Abe, 1992) that ¡Rg[= ¡(@R=@g) = Cg(!)] is the unit
cost of public sector abatement, where ! is the vector of factor returns. For the rest
of the analysis we assume that Rgg = 0.9 The R(t;g) function is strictly convex in
the emission tax rate (i.e. Rtt > 0), meaning that an increase in the emission tax rate
lowers the amount of pollution emission by the private sector. It is also known (e.g.
see Copeland, 1994 and Turunen-Red and Woodland, 1998) that:
z = ¡Rt(t;g): (1)
Therefore, taking into account both private and public sector pollution abate-
ment, the net emission of pollution, r, is deﬁned as:
r = z ¡ g = ¡Rt(t;g) ¡ g: (2)
7For simplicity, we consider only one type of pollution generated in one or more sectors.
8A prime (0) denotes a transposed vector or matrix. The technology set includes pollution abate-
ment technologies as well as production technologies, in various private sectors, i.e. the private sector
carries out some abatement of pollution in response to the imposition of an emission tax.
9This assumption implies that changes in g which change factor supplies available to produce
private goods, do not aﬀect its unit cost of production. For example, in a conventional Heckscher-
Ohlin model, factor prices are determined by commodity prices and are independent of changes in
factor endowments. In such a case, when g changes, Cg
g = ¡Rgg = 0 (e.g. see Abe 1992).
5We also assume that Rtg > 0. In view of (1), we have Rtg = ¡@z=@g, and
therefore this assumption states that an increase in the publicly provided pollution
abatement reduces emission by the private sector. The justiﬁcation for this assumption
lies in an induced Rybczynski eﬀect on private goods production due to an increase in
g. In other words, an increase in g lowers the supply of factor endowments available for
the production of private goods. This means that, on the whole, private production
is reduced, which in turn implies a reduction in total pollution.
As for the public sector, we assume that the government ﬁnances the cost of
publicly provided pollution abatement (i.e. gCg = ¡gRg(t;g)) by allocating a fraction,
¸, of the revenue raised from emission taxes (tz = ¡tRt(t;g)) for this purpose. The
remaining (1 ¡ ¸) fraction of emission tax revenue is returned to the consumers in a
lump-sum fashion.10 Thus, the government’s budget constraint is written as:
¸tz = ¡gRg(t;g): (3)
Turning to the demand side of the economy, utility, as previously noted, is
adversely aﬀected by both local net pollution, r, and foreign net pollution, r¤, trans-
mitted across borders. Denoting by µ the rate of cross-border pollution into the home
country or the spill-over parameter, welfare is adversely aﬀected by the aggregate level
of net pollution ½ = r + µr¤. The expenditure function E(½;u) denotes the minimum
expenditure required to achieve a given level of utility u at constant commodity prices
p.11 The partial derivative of the expenditure function with respect to u, Eu, denotes
the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income. Since pollution adversely aﬀects
household utility, the partial derivative of the expenditure function with respect to ½,
10For the justiﬁcation for this speciﬁc rule for the funding of public abatement activities, see
footnote 3. However, as noted in footnote 4, this assumption is made without loss of generality
except in one case (see footnote 13). To be more speciﬁc, all but one of our results will go through if
public abatement activities were funded entirely from lump-sum taxation of the consumers and the
whole of the revenue from emission tax was returned to the consumers in a lump-sum fashion. The
reason for this is that the instrument ¸ eﬀectively acts as lump-sum taxation since the remaining
fraction, as just noted, is returned to the consumers in a lump-sum fashion.
11For reasons previously noted, the constant commodity prices are omitted from the expenditure
function. This formulation of aggregate (additive) level of net pollution, ½, implicitly assumes that the
two countries emit the same pollutant. One could easily generalize the formulation by expressing the
expenditure function as E(r;r¤;u). However, this is avoided in the paper as it creates unrewarding
complications.
6E½, is positive and denotes the households’ marginal willingness to pay for a reduction
in pollution (e.g. see Chao and Yu, 1999). That is, a higher level of net pollution
requires a higher level of spending on private goods to mitigate its detrimental eﬀects
so that a constant level of utility is maintained. The expenditure function is assumed
strictly convex in ½, i.e. E½½ > 0. That is, a higher level of net pollution raises
the households’ marginal willingness to pay for its reduction. It is also assumed that
E½u > 0, i.e. a higher level of utility increases the households’ marginal willingness to
pay for pollution abatement.
The budget constraint for the representative consumer requires that private
spending E(½;u) must equal factor incomes from the production of private goods
R(t;g) and that from public abatement activities (¡gRg(t;g)), plus the part of emis-
sion tax revenue that is returned to the consumers in a lump-sum fashion ((1 ¡¸)tz).
Using (3), the home country’s budget constraint is written as:
E(½;u) = R(t;g) ¡ gRg(t;g) + (1 ¡ ¸)tz: (4)









































where ½¤ = r¤ + µ¤r and µ¤ is the rate of cross-border pollution into the foreign
country. Equations (1)-(8) constitute a system of eight equations in terms of the
eight unknowns, namely u;u¤;z;z¤;r;r¤;g and g¤. The model contains four policy
instruments — two for each country, and these are: the emission tax rates (t;t¤)
and the fractions (¸;¸¤) of emission tax revenue used to ﬁnance public abatement
activities.
73 The Nash equilibrium
We begin this section by characterizing the Nash optimal levels of the policy param-
eters, and then carry out a comparative static exercise. For this end, we diﬀerentiate
(1)-(8) to obtain the changes in the level of home and foreign country welfare as
follows:12
∆du = Atdt + At¤dt
¤ + A¸d¸ + A¸¤d¸
¤ + Aµdµ; (9)
∆du
¤ = Btdt + Bt¤dt






















































Bt¤;B¸¤;Bt;B¸;K1 and Bµ¤ are similarly deﬁned.
Before explaining (9) and (10), we examine how the policy parameters aﬀect the
level of net emission in each country. Because of the assumed structural symmetry of
the two countries, it suﬃces to examine the eﬀects in the home country; the expression
for the foreign country can be similarly obtained. Diﬀerentiating (1)-(3), we get:
(Rg ¡ ¸tRtg)dr = tz(1 + Rtg)d¸ + [(¸tr=g)Rtt + (¸z + gRgt)(1 + Rtg)]dt: (11)
Equation (11) indicates that an increase in ¸, by increasing government revenue
available for public abatement of pollution, unambiguously increases public abatement
of pollution g and thus reduces local pollution. This increase in g in turn reduces pri-
vate emission of pollution z, since Rtg > 0. On one hand, an increase in t reduces
12The Appendix sets up the matrix system of changes in the variables of the model.
8pollution emission by private producers. On the other hand, this reduction in pol-
lution emission by private producers reduces the tax base for the provision of public
abatement. The net eﬀect of an increase in t on r is therefore a priori ambiguous.
However, as it happens, the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect via changes in
tax revenue, and an increase in t unambiguously reduces net emission. Note that (1)
and (3) alone determine the equilibrium values for g and z, and therefore r is inde-
pendent of the policy parameters in the foreign country, i.e. dr=dt¤ = dr=d¸¤ = 0.
Similarly, for the foreign country, an increase in either ¸¤ or t¤ reduces r¤. Further-
more, dr¤=dt = dr¤=d¸ = 0.
Turning to the eﬀects on the level of welfare in the home country ((9)), an
increase in t, as noted before, unambiguously reduces net emission and thus, ceteris
paribus, raises welfare. However, an increase in t reduces the representative consumer’s
lump-sum income by, for example, reducing pollution tax revenue for a given t. The
net eﬀect on welfare is therefore ambiguous.
An increase in ¸ increases public abatement and therefore reduces pollution.
However, it also has a negative income eﬀect as it implies a lower lump-sum transfer
(out of emission tax revenue) to the consumers. Therefore, the net eﬀect of a change
in ¸ on welfare in also ambiguous. An increase in t¤ or in ¸¤ unambiguously improves
home welfare via reduced cross-border pollution, i.e. by reducing emission in the
foreign country. Finally, as shown by the expression Aµ, an increase in the rate of
cross-border pollution into the home country reduces its welfare. The eﬀects on welfare
in the foreign country can be similarly explained.
Having explained the welfare equations, we can now characterize the non-
cooperative Nash optimal levels of the policy instruments. That is, when the two
countries choose respectively the levels of (t;¸) and(t¤;¸¤) simultaneously by maximiz-
ing their respective welfare, with each country treating the other’s policy parameters
9as given. The ﬁrst order conditions are given by:
∆(du=dt) = At = 0; (12)
∆(du=d¸) = A¸ = 0; (13)
∆(du
¤=dt
¤) = Bt¤ = 0; (14)
∆(du
¤=d¸
¤) = B¸¤ = 0: (15)
Equations (12) to (15) simultaneously determine the optimal (Nash) values of
the policy instruments in the two countries. Manipulating the equilibrium conditions
At = A¸ = 0, for the home country, and Bt¤ = B¸¤ = 0 for the foreign country, we
obtain the following optimality conditions:







Recognising the fact that pollution is a ‘public bad’ and its abatement is a public
good, it is interesting to note that the optimality conditions (16) and (17) combine
the Samuelson rule for the optimal provision for public goods in a closed economy
without distortionary taxes with the Pigouvian rule for environmental taxation. The
ﬁrst equality in the optimality conditions (16) and (17) gives the Pigouvian rule, viz.
that the marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement is equal to emission
tax rate. The second equality gives the Samuelsonial rule, viz. that the marginal
willingness to pay for a public good is equal to the marginal cost of producing it. We
are able to achieve the two rules here because the instruments ¸ and ¸¤ to some degree
function as lump-sum taxes for the ﬁnancing of public abatement (see footnote 10).
We conclude this section by performing a simple comparative static exercise
in order to highlight the working of our model. For this, we assume that one of the
countries, viz. the foreign, is passive in the sense that it does not choose its policy
instruments optimally, i.e. (17) does not apply and t¤ and ¸¤ are exogenous. Under
10this assumption, we examine how a change in µ, the rate of cross-border pollution into
the home country, aﬀects the Nash values of the country’s policy instruments (t;¸).
Diﬀerentiating (12) and (13) and setting dt¤ = d¸¤ = 0, we obtain:
Attdt + At¸d¸ = ¡Atµdµ; (18)
A¸tdt + A¸¸d¸ = ¡A¸µdµ; (19)
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K2 = t(1 ¡ ¸)Rtt + (1 + Rtg)(¸z + gRgt) > 0:




















1(Rg ¡ ¸tRtg)(1 + Rtg)Rtt]
¡1K2r
¤Rtg < 0;
H2 = [tz(1 + Rtg)E½½]
¡1r
¤(Rg ¡ ¸tRtg) < 0;
´ = E½u(½=Eu) > 0; and ³ = E½½(½=E½) > 0;
and ´ is the home country’s marginal propensity to pay for pollution abatement, ³ is
the elasticity of the marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement with respect
to the aggregate level of net pollution, and the superscript ‘o’ denotes the optimal
levels of the policy instruments.
11Observing (20) and (21), we note that the optimal values of both instruments
increase with µ if and only if ´ < ³. Intuitively, an increase in µ exerts two eﬀects on
utility. First, an increase in µ reduces utility and therefore the marginal willingness
to pay for pollution abatement, and this in turn lowers the optimal (Nash) values
of the emission tax rate and of the fraction of emission tax revenue used for public
sector abatement activities. We call this an income eﬀect which is represented by
the variable ´ deﬁned above. Second, an increase in µ directly increases the marginal
willingness to pay for pollution abatement and this raises the Nash values of t and
¸. We call this the direct eﬀect, represented by the variable ³. If the income eﬀect
dominates the direct eﬀect, then a higher µ reduces the Nash values for both t and ¸.
Having characterized the optimal values of the policy instruments and having
carried out a comparative static exercise, we now consider the issue of multilateral
reforms of the policy instruments, starting from the point where these are set at their
Nash optimal levels.
4 Multilateral policy reforms
In this section we analyze the welfare and environmental implications of multilateral
policy reforms. We consider a number of scenarios depending on the scope of such
reforms. In each case, however, we assume that the initial values of the policy instru-
ments are at their Nash optimal levels so that it is only the international externalities
of the policy instruments (via changes in cross-border pollution) that are present in





¤ = Btdt + B¸d¸: (23)
It will be convenient to express changes in welfare in terms of changes in emis-
sion levels. Totally diﬀerentiating (4) and using (1)-(3), it can be shown that, when
12the initial equilibrium is at the Nash optimum level,
Eu du = ¡µE½dr
¤; (24)








That is, changes in welfare in a country depend only on changes in the level of cross-
border pollution into the country. In particular, an increase in net pollution in one
country unambiguously reduces welfare in the other country via an increase in the level
of cross-border pollution. Note that own-country pollution does not aﬀect welfare as,
at the Nash optimum, it is only the international externalities that matter.
We start with a benchmark case in which we examine the eﬀects on the levels
of individual national welfare and net pollution when the two countries decide to raise
both instruments —emission tax rate and fraction of tax revenue allocated for public
abatement. Since the two countries are symmetric in structure, we derive explicitly
only the eﬀects for the home country, and simply state the analogous eﬀect for the
foreign country.
4.1 Comprehensive reforms
In this reform programme, we consider a multilateral agreement which amounts to
dt > 0;d¸ > 0;dt¤ > 0, and d¸¤ > 0. Because of (24) and (25), it suﬃces to examine
the eﬀects on net pollution levels.
Using the optimality conditions (17), from (11) we obtain:
dr=dt = (Rg ¡ ¸tRtg)
¡1K2 < 0; (26)
dr=d¸ = (Rg ¡ ¸tRtg)
¡1tz(1 + Rtg) < 0: (27)
That is, the reform considered in this subsection unambiguously lowers net
emission levels in both countries and therefore increases welfare in both countries.
Formally, these results are stated as a proposition.
13Proposition 1 A multilateral increase of all policy instruments (t;¸;t¤ and ¸¤) from
their Nash values raises national welfare and reduces net pollution in both countries.
Intuitively, the Nash equilibrium is characterised by the well-known ineﬃcieny
of over-provision of a public bad. Therefore, any multilateral policy initiative that
reduces this ineﬃciency improves welfare levels.
4.2 Partial reforms
In this subsection we consider the case where the multilateral negotiations are re-
stricted to only one policy instrument, viz. emission taxes. Moreover, once agreements
on emission taxes are made, the countries are free to adjust the other instrument, the
fractions of emission tax revenue allocated to public abatement practices, i.e. ¸ and ¸¤,
to achieve selﬁsh interests. We consider in turns two alternative rules for the national
governments for adjusting the fraction of tax revenue allocated to public abatement
activities: (i) public abatement neutrality, i.e. the two governments keep funds avail-
able for public abatement, evaluated at the initial level of emission, at the same level
as before the reform, and (ii) optimality in adjustment, i.e. the two countries adjust
optimally their other instrument (¸;¸¤).
4.2.1 Case 1: Public abatement neutrality
In the present case, we assume that having agreed multilaterally to increase emission
taxes, the two countries adjust the values of the fractions of tax revenue allocated
to public abatement so that total funds allocated for public abatement, i.e. ¸tz and
¸¤t¤z¤ respectively for each country, remain constant at the initial levels of emission
z and z¤.13 That is, for a given dt and dt¤, the home and the foreign governments
choose d¸ and d¸ respectively such that






13This exercise is not meaningful when public abatement activities are ﬁnanced by lump-sum
taxation of the consumers. This is the exception mentioned in footnotes 4 and 10.
14which can be simpliﬁed to:





where dt > 0 and dt¤ > 0:
The eﬀect of the above tax reform on net pollution in the two countries is
calculated from (11) and its counterpart for the foreign country, as:
dr=dt = (@r=@t) + (@r=@¸)(d¸=dt) = (Rg ¡ ¸tRtg)


















3 < 0; (30)
where K3 = t(1¡¸)Rtt+(1+Rtg)gRgt > 0 and K¤
3 is deﬁned analogously. In (29) the
terms @r=@t and @r=@¸ are obtained from (11), and d¸=dt is given by (28). Similarly,
the terms @r¤=@t¤ and @r¤=@¸¤ can be obtained by considering the parallel equations
for the foreign country. Equations (29) and (30) indicate that the present policy reform
unambiguously reduces net emission levels in both countries, and therefore, because of
(24) and (25), it increases welfare levels in both countries. These results are formally
stated as:
Proposition 2 Consider a multilateral increase of the emission tax rates t and t¤ from
their Nash optimal levels, while the national governments adjust ¸ and ¸¤ to maintain
the level of funds allocated for public sector abatement, at the initial equilibrium level of
gross pollution in each country. This reform — which involves an increase in private
sector abatement and a decrease in the public sector one — unambiguously improves
welfare and reduces the level of net pollution in both countries.
4.2.2 Case 2: Optimality in adjustment
In this case, we assume that the two countries, upon agreeing to multilateral reforms of
the emission tax rates t and t¤, adjust optimally their respective second instrument, ¸
and ¸¤, the fraction of tax revenue used for public sector abatement activities. Specif-
ically, we assume that the home country and the foreign country use the optimality
15conditions A¸ = 0 and B¸¤ = 0 respectively to adjust the second policy instrument.
This gives
dA¸ = 0 =) d¸ = ¡A
¡1
¸¸A¸tdt; (31)





































Recall that K1 < 0 and K¤
2 > 0. The expressions for A¸¸(< 0) and A¸t(< 0) are as in
(18) and (19).
Substituting the above expressions in (11) and its foreign counterpart, we ob-
tain:
dr=dt = (@r=@t) + (@r=@¸)(d¸=dt)
= (Rg ¡ ¸tRtg)
¡1K2 ¡ (Rg ¡ ¸tRtg)




























2 = 0: (34)
Equations (33) and (34) (and (24) and (25)) indicate that, the present reform
has no eﬀect whatsoever on net emission and utility levels in either country. To see
why this is the case, consider the eﬀects for the home country (i.e. (33) and (24)).
An increase in the tax rate reduces emission by the private sector (z), and thus exerts
a negative impact on net emission (i.e. @r=@t < 0). From (31) it is clear that the
adjustment is such that ¸ is reduced due to the increase in t. As a result, total
funds available for public sector abatement activities are reduced on two counts: (i) a
reduction in the tax base due to a reduction in z, and (ii) a reduction in funds allocated
for public sector abatement due to a reduction in ¸. These two eﬀects reinforce each
other and the level of public sector abatement goes down and thus raising net emission.
16The two opposing eﬀects of the policy reform on net emission r cancel each other out.
This is because at the optimum the two instruments are perfect substitutes in our
model. On the beneﬁt side, one unit extra abatement in either the private sector
or the public one reduces emission by the same amount. On the cost side, at the
optimum, the marginal cost of abatement in the public sector is equal to the marginal
cost of abatement in the private sector (which, for proﬁt maximising ﬁrms, must be
equal to the emission tax rate t: the marginal beneﬁt of abatement in the private
sector).
These results are formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider a multilateral increase of the emission tax rates t and t¤ from
their Nash optimal levels, while the national governments adjust ¸ and ¸¤ optimally.
This reform has no eﬀect on the levels of national welfare and of net pollution.
A policy implication of the above proposition is that if the scope of multilateral
policy reform is limited in the sense it applies only to a subset of instruments — as it
is often the case, and the individual countries are free to adjust the remaining instru-
ments after the reforms, then the beneﬁcial eﬀects of such reforms can be seriously
undermined.
4.3 Target decrease in emission levels
In this section we analyze the welfare implications of a multilateral agreement in
which the two countries agree on a speciﬁc reduction in emission levels (i.e. dr < 0
and dr¤ < 0), but the countries are free to choose any instrument they want to achieve
the target reduction in emission.
Using the Nash optimality conditions (16) and (17), from (11) (and its foreign
counterpart) we ﬁnd the relationships between changes in emission levels and changes
17in the instruments as:

















From the above equations it is clear that @r=@i < 0 (i = t;¸) and @r¤=@i < 0
(i = t¤;¸¤). It is also evident that the two countries can choose inﬁnitely many
combinations of policy changes — (dt;d¸) and (dt¤;d¸¤) — to achieve given targets
of emission reductions dr and dr¤ respectively. In view of the fact that the welfare in
each country, at the Nash optimum, depends only on the level of cross-border pollution
(see (24) and (25)), any combination of policy changes satisfying (35) and (36) will
result in welfare gains in the two countries.
Proposition 4 A multilateral agreement where both countries agree to reduce emis-
sion levels from their Nash optimal levels by a speciﬁc amount is strictly Pareto im-
proving.
As we have shown previously (see (24) and (25)), changes in welfare in the
two countries evaluated at the Nash optimum, depends only on changes in the level of
cross-border pollution and not on the ways changes in cross-border pollution have been
brought about. Because of this, If the two governments agree on a target reduction
in emission levels (leaving the instruments for achieving such a goal to the respective
governments), they are able to target the problem directly, and the extend of welfare
gains in the two countries are independent of how the individual countries achieve
their goals.
5 Reform policy towards the second-best
In this section, unlike the previous one, we assume arbitrary initial values for the
policy instruments (t;¸;t¤;¸¤), and then we consider the reform exercises that take
18the values of all policy instruments towards the second-best levels. In particular, we
consider the following reform program:
dt = ¡b1[t ¡ t
o(t;t
¤;¸;¸



















where b1; b2; b¤
1 and b¤
2 are positive scalars, and (to;¸o;to¤; ¸o¤) represent the shadow
values of the policy instruments obtained from (12) and (13) for the home country,
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The above reform program requires that the values of the policy instruments are
raised (lowered) if their initial levels are lower (higher) than the respective second-best
levels.
Using (3), (12)-(15) and (39)-(42), we obtain from (9) and (10):
∆ du = ¡c1(t ¡ t
o) dt ¡ c2(¸ ¡ ¸
o) d¸ + At¤ dt













¤ + Bt dt + B¸ d¸; (44)
where
c1 = (RgRtt ¡ (¸t + gRgt)Rgt)K
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14This concept of shadow values is used extensively in the literature (see, for example, Copeland
(1994), Neary (1995) and Turunen-Red and Woodland (1998)).
19Substituting (37) and (38) into (43) and (44), the induced welfare changes are
given by:15
du = b1c1(t ¡ t
o)




















2 + Btdt + B¸d¸: (46)
The above equations clearly indicate that the eﬀects of reforms of own policy
instruments — given by the ﬁrst two terms in (45) and (46)— are positive. In contrast,
since At¤, A¸¤, B¸ and Bt are unambiguously positive, the international externality
eﬀects — given by the last two terms in (45) and (46)— are ambiguous. This is because
the reform rules do not make any speciﬁc directional recommendation. However,
suﬃcient conditions for these eﬀects to be positive are that initial values the policy
instruments are below their second-best levels, i.e. to ¸ t and ¸o ¸ ¸, t¤o ¸ t¤;
¸¤o ¸ ¸¤. Formally,
Proposition 5 In the presence of cross-border pollution, a multilateral reform of en-
vironmental policy instruments towards the second-best is strictly Pareto improving if
the initial values of the policy instruments are below their second-best levels.
We conclude this section by noting that Copeland (1994) also considered en-
vironmental policy reforms towards the second best for a small open economy with
both trade and pollution distortions but without any international externality and
public abatement. He found that equiproportional reforms of pollution taxes towards
the second best, in the presence or absence of tariﬀs, is always welfare improving.
Turunen-Red and Woodland (1998) consider a similar reform in a very general setup
with many countries, endogenous terms of trade, and transboundary pollution, albeit
not with public abatement. In their analysis, inter alia, they derive conditions under
which pollution tax reform of the type considered in this section is potentially Pareto
improving, i.e. strictly Pareto improving in the presence of international transfers. In
15It is to be noted that (t¡to);(¸¡¸o);(t¤ ¡t¤o) and (¸¤ ¡¸¤o) are called the shadow premia of
the policy instruments (see, for example, Neary (1995)).
20contrast, we consider a two-country model with international externality and public
abatement of pollution, in which we have two diﬀerent types environmental policies
present simultaneously. In this context, we show that in the presence of international
externalities reforms towards the second best of either one type or both types of en-
vironmental policies may not increase welfare in either of the two countries.
6 Conclusion
It is now widely acknowledged that pollution is a global issue and it requires a global
approach. Pollution generated in one country often has far reaching implications for
other countries. With these in mind, the international community has been very
active in recent years organising international conferences to come up with binding
commitments by individual countries to reduce pollution emission, the so-called Kyoto
protocol being the outcome of the last such high-proﬁle conference.
These developments in the policy arena have been accompanied by academic
research on the subject and there is now a small theoretical literature that analyses
the implications of multilateral reforms of environmental policies. However, with one
exception, this literature does not acknowledge the fact that often the private and the
public sectors complement each other in abating pollution.
Motivated by such deﬁciencies in the literature, we develop a two-country model
where production generated pollution is emitted across borders, and pollution abate-
ment is undertaken both by private and public sectors of each country. An important
feature of the present model, not widely used in the relevant literature despite the
existence of substantial empirical evidence, is that part of the emission tax revenue is
earmarked to ﬁnance the public sector pollution abatement. The analysis characterises
the Nash optimal rates of the policy instruments in each country (viz., the emission
tax rate and the fraction of emission tax revenue allocated to public abatement), and
examines the environmental and welfare implications of several multilateral policy
21reforms.
The policy implication emerging from the analysis is that multilateral policy re-
forms can raise national welfare and reduce net pollution in both countries. However,
the beneﬁcial eﬀects of such reforms can be undermined if the reforms are restricted
to a subset of policy instruments, i.e. while a country agrees to tighten one of in-
struments multilaterally, it is free to adjust the other instruments for selﬁsh motives.
Furthermore, in the presence of international spill-over of pollution, a move towards
the non-cooperative optimal level of the instruments may not always be welfare im-
proving. In our framework, the multilateral reform that set emission target reductions
directly, giving the individual countries freedom to decide how they achieve the target
reduction, is likely to be more eﬀective.
22Appendix: The Matrix System of Changes in the Variables
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